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Altruism is not . . . an agreeable ornament to social life, but it will forever be its 
fundamental basis. How can we really dispense with it? 
—Emile Durkheim 
 
 
Eva is dressing to get out in this windy winter night. Like every Wednesday, 
she is meeting with the other committee members of the Elisa Network. This 
meeting promises to go on for a long time. They must decide if they have 
enough resources to join other organizations that help refugees and asylum 
seekers in order to organize a common campaign against the new law on the 
status of refugees adopted by the Swiss government. They must discuss sev-
eral difficult cases of deportation of asylum seekers, and one of these cases is 
under Eva’s responsibility. Finally, they must elect a new directing commit-
tee of the organization for the coming year. Eva is worried. She has spent the 
whole week running from one government office to another, meeting many 
people to get advice, spending hours with the organization’s lawyer in order 
to find a solution for Azis, a young Algerian who asked for political asylum 
in Switzerland. The federal office in charge of asylum has just denied giving 
him refugee status. Algeria is not deemed to be a dangerous country that 
violates human rights. Therefore, Azis cannot prove that he was a victim of 
violent aggression in his country, where a civil war has already killed thou-
sands of people. Azis is not a journalist, nor a member of a human rights 
organization; he is simply a bricklayer who, one day, voiced too loudly his 
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opinion about his country, about violence, about repression. After numerous 
anonymous threats and a physical attack on his way home from work, he 
decided to run away and look for asylum in a European country. Once he 
arrived in Switzerland, one of his compatriots gave him the address of the 
Elisa Network in case he had troubles with the Swiss administration—which 
happened. Eva, a thirty-year-old high school teacher, is his only legal sup-
port. She is used to this type of situation. Since she decided to join the Elisa 
Network ten years ago, she has seen hundreds of such situations. 
 Eva is not the only one who is deeply involved in this political struggle; 
hundreds of activists are engaged in defending the interests, rights, and iden-
tities of refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrant workers all over Europe. 
One of Germany’s largest protest marches after the country’s reunification in 
1989 addressed this issue. In the late 1980s, Germany witnessed a worrisome 
wave of violent attacks against foreigners, with refugee centers burned out, 
Turkish and Afghan shops destroyed, and immigrants physically threatened. 
Hoyerswerda and Rostock were on the front page of newspapers, but many 
other German cities faced the same rise of racist attacks. In fall of 1992, 
300,000 people went into the streets of Berlin to protest the rise of racism in 
the country. Some of them were similar to Eva; others were certainly less 
involved than she. But all shared the same outrage for what was going on. 
 Switzerland is not the only place in the world to host immigrants, of 
course, although with nearly one-fifth of the population being made up of 
foreigners, Switzerland has one of the world’s highest shares of non-national 
citizens. Other countries are in a similar situation: France, for example, with 
the fight for the regularization of the sans-papiers; Italy, with the influx of 
illegal immigrants from Albania, Kosovo, and Turkey, who join the Italian 
coast through the Adriatic Sea along with those entering from the southern 
coast of the Mediterranean coming from Algeria and Tunisia; Austria, with 
particularly high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment; Belgium, England, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Spain—in short, virtually all European countries are 
faced with the “hot” issue of migration. While governments generally try to 
implement increasingly restrictive immigration laws, many European citizens 
feel threatened by these newcomers and are participating in a new wave of 
racism and xenophobia. Many other Europeans like Eva organize campaigns 
against such restrictions, fighting discrimination against immigrants in their 
host society, offering them legal as well as material support, and mobilizing 
to claim political, social, and cultural rights for foreigners. 
 Not all these people are politically engaged to defend the interests, rights, 
and identities of immigrants. Some are involved in human rights organiza-
tions that seek state protection for people whose fundamental rights are vio-
lated, while others are working on behalf of the populations of the so-called 
Third World, asking for education, health care, and more generally, a better 
human development of these populations. We all still have in mind the more 
than a decade-long international campaign against apartheid in South Africa; 
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the large mobilizations in support of new political regimes in Central Ameri-
ca; the support given by many people and organizations to the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, who were—and still are—looking for their 
daughters and sons who disappeared during the military regime; the public 
campaigns aimed to raise money for the victims of famines in sub-Saharan 
Africa; the wave of protest in many Western countries against the repression 
by the Chinese authorities of the student movement on Tienanmen Square; or 
the international campaign promoted by Third World organizations to stop 
the production of landmines. These are all well-known cases, but thousands 
of similar actions have been carried out all over Europe and North America. 
 Altruism takes on a political and collective form with the emergence of the 
solidarity movement. Individuals who are involved in this movement defend 
the interests, rights, and identities of others. We have given above some ex-
amples of those aided: asylum seekers, political refugees, immigrant workers, 
peoples whose human rights are being infringed, victims of racist acts or 
sentiments, and populations of Third World countries. The acts of political 
mobilization by those in the movement do not serve their own interests. The-
se individuals do not stand to benefit directly from their participation in con-
tentious collective action. These militants have been defined by McCarthy 
and Zald (1977) as “conscience constituents.” In contrast, participants in 
labor, civil rights, gay, women’s, ecology, and antinuclear movements—only 
to mention a few examples—obtain from their actions new collective goods 
or at least prevent new “collective bads,” to the extent, of course, that mobili-
zation is successful. Unlike these individuals, when Eva joins the Elisa Net-
work committee on Wednesday, when she takes part in public demonstra-
tions to protest restrictive immigration measures, when she collects money 
for a new campaign denouncing police violence against asylum seekers who 
are registering at the country’s borders, she does not benefit from the sub-
stantial outcomes of her actions. In this sense, the solidarity movement may 
be seen as an instance of political altruism. But is it really so? Is this move-
ment a genuine political expression of altruism? And, as a corollary, does the 
solidarity movement, which is potentially distinct from other types of conten-
tious collective action, follow its own specific logic of mobilization? If this is 
the case, how is the solidarity movement distinct from other movements 
whose members received directly the benefits of their involvement? These 
are the central questions that lie at the heart of this book and that pervade all 
the following chapters. 
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Political Altruism: A Definition 
 
Before we discuss these questions in more detail, it is worthwhile to better 
define the notion of political altruism. In fact, there hardly is a consensual 
definition of altruism. Authors from different fields define it differently. 
Nevertheless, definitions given by psychologists—which are as numerous as 
the authors who have written on this topic—emphasize two peculiarities of 
altruism that are relevant for our purpose: its intentional-oriented character 
and the actors’ costs/benefits balance (Piliavin and Charng 1990). While the 
latter characteristic has gained a large consensus in the literature, the former 
characteristic has been emphasized by motivational approaches. Contrary to 
behaviorist approaches, which define altruism as “social behavior carried out 
to achieve positive outcomes for another rather than for the self” (Rushton  
1980, 8)—that is, they stress what individuals do regardless of their motiva-
tions—motivational approaches define altruism as “a motivational state with 
the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare” (Baston and Shaw 1991, 
108). This perspective brings important elements to the definition of altruism 
by viewing it as a rational behavior. Thus altruism becomes a motivated 
individual act which stems from intentions. In this tradition, Bar-Tal (1985-
86) provides a definition of altruism based on five characteristics of this hu-
man behavior: “altruistic behavior (a) must benefit to other persons, (b) must 
be performed voluntarily, (c) must be performed intentionally, (d) the benefit 
must be the goal by itself, and (e) must be performed without expecting any 
external reward” (5). The acts of Eva may be described, at first glance, as 
altruistic. She is acting on behalf of other people; her actions are not per-
formed under constraints; she is doing it voluntarily; she is well aware of the 
meaning of what she is doing; her actions are rational and have a clear aim; 
and finally, she is not expecting any material rewards from her engagement. 
In brief, Eva’s behavior on behalf of asylum seekers and political refugees 
has two characteristics: it is performed intentionally, and entails costs for 
herself and benefits for others. From the individual point of view, Eva’s acts 
have a clear altruistic aim. From the collective point of view, her actions, 
together with those of hundreds of other people mobilizing for the same polit-
ical goals—i.e., claiming rights for immigrants, for Third World populations, 
for people whose fundamental rights have been infringed—can be seen as 
political altruism. More precisely, political altruism we define as all actions 
(a) performed collectively, (b) that have a political aim and (c) an altruistic 
orientation as defined by Bar-Tal above. Thus, political altruism is a form of 
behavior based on acts performed by a group or/and on behalf of a group, and 
not aimed to meet individual interests; it is directed at a political goal of so-
cial change or the redefinition of power relations; and individuals involved in 
this type of social change do not stand to benefit directly from the success 
deriving from the accomplishment of those goals. Following this definition, 
the actions performed by the solidarity movement can be characterized as 
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political altruism. Participants in the solidarity movement act collectively 
with a clear political aim, and their actions are pursued to the benefit of other 
people. 
 Is the contemporary solidarity movement the only example of political 
altruism within the Western world? Certainly not. In late nineteenth-century 
England, for example, there were strikes in support of African slaves working 
in the cotton fields in the American South. African slaves were fighting for 
freedom, facing a hostile social and economic order that seemed to be fixed 
forever. They engaged in a long and costly struggle to abolish slavery in the 
“country of freedom.” They received political support from northern enlight-
ened political elites, who understood that the slavery system was no longer 
humanly and economically viable, but also from English textile workers. 
Despite their hard living conditions, the latter went on strike to support the 
struggle of thousands of slaves in the United States. Another relevant exam-
ple of political altruism took place during the Spanish civil war. Socialist 
activists from all over Europe enlisted in militias to fight against Franco’s 
regime and in favor of socialism and freedom in this southern corner of Eu-
rope. Most of them were enrolled in their homeland by their comrades, as 
they used to call them, and traveled to Spain by bus, train, or foot to bolster 
their Spanish comrades, an extremely risky enterprise in which many lost 
their lives. 
 Less risky and more recent instances of altruism can observed in what 
Wuthnow (1991) calls “acts of compassion.” According to this author, 45 
percent of the adult population in the United States and almost as many in 
Europe are engaged in voluntary associations to help other people: drug ad-
dicts, battered women, handicapped persons, elderly, ill people, homeless, 
unemployed, and others.1 The voluntary sector—i.e., the third sector, located 
between the market and the state, and made up of nonprofit associations—in 
Europe and North America is as varied as human troubles. Is supplying assis-
tance to the disadvantaged a form of political altruism? This is less clear. 
Political altruism, as we define it, has three main features: actions pursued 
collectively, with a clear political goal of social change, and whose outcomes 
are to benefit others. The nonprofit sector displays the first and the last fea-
ture. Assistance to the disadvantaged is organized collectively, usually within 
formal organizations whose actions should benefit third parties. However, to 
have an explicit political aim is a necessary condition for characterizing col-
lective action as political altruism. This does not mean that volunteering is an 
aimless enterprise, only that it generally does not have a political aim. Nor 
does it mean that the voluntary sector does not fulfill a political role in the 
modern society. As Tocqueville (1956) pointed out many years ago, volun-
tary associations are a key feature of a strong democracy.2 Yet, they usually 
do not engage in political claim-making, nor in social change.3 Nonprofit 
organizations provide social help to the disadvantaged, to the “underclass,” a 
task that is not—or not sufficiently—fulfilled by the state, but they are not 
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striving collectively for political changes and are not endorsing a political 
issue. In other words, they are not involved in a political conflict. 
 In his groundbreaking book on parties, Rokkan (1970) has shown how 
these political organizations have built upon preexisting cultural and social 
cleavages.4 Once these cultural and social dividing lines are politically 
framed by collective actors such as parties, interest groups, and social move-
ments, they become political cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Rokkan 
stresses five cleavages around which European political parties are struc-
tured. These cleavages provide collective actors with social and cultural re-
sources upon which they anchor their claims. Political cleavages are distinct 
from one another; they have their own coherence and homogeneity (thus 
providing political actors who are mobilizing around these conflicting lines 
with a coherent ideological framework); and they are usually supported by 
specific social categories. The nonprofit sector does not have such underlying 
political cleavages. On the contrary, it is very heterogeneous and mobilizes a 
variety of social strata with no coherent ideological framework. Actions com-
ing out of the voluntary sector are not built upon a political cleavage; they are 
“acts of compassion” which, most of the time, are a palliative to the lack of 
state intervention. 
 By contrast, actions carried out by the solidarity movement can be charac-
terized as political altruism: collective actions performed on behalf of other 
people and built upon a specific political cleavage. Next we turn to the prin-
cipal features of the solidarity movement. A brief look at its historical, cul-
tural, social, and political anchoring will allow us to unveil its peculiarities. 
At the same time, this will also highlight the political cleavage upon which its 
mobilization is based. 
 
From the Old to the New Solidarity Movement: 
Cultural Resources and Political Cleavages 
 
The solidarity movement builds upon specific cultural and symbolic re-
sources. Human rights violations form the main grievance that underlies its 
mobilization. As we know from the literature on social movements, grievanc-
es and structural social conflicts are a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the emergence of contentious collective action. Resources are also need-
ed.5 Three sets of cultural and symbolic resources—three “master frames” 
(Snow and Benford 1992)—were available to help the political framing of 
the human rights grievance: the Christian cosmology, the humanist compo-
nent of the Enlightenment, and the socialist tradition. The Christian world 
provides the movement with the idea of helping your neighbor, giving 
her/him love, assistance, protection, and care. From the humanist component 
of the Enlightenment, the solidarity movement draws a coherent discourse on 
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the respect for human rights and individual freedom. Finally, the early social-
ist movement put forth the ideal of a more just and egalitarian society. 
 These three cultural traditions provide the solidarity movement with crucial 
symbolic resources, but also with social, material, and human resources. The 
first organizations to mobilize in the name of human rights emerged within 
these three social networks, drawing from them material and human support. 
The first protests held to defend human rights came from religious organiza-
tions which pulled together Christians who were motivated by the idea of 
giving assistance to suffering men and women; by humanist clubs which 
mobilized intellectuals and libertarians who were nourished by the philoso-
phy of the Enlightenment; and by socialist forums which gathered workers as 
well as several intellectuals who wanted to work politically for a new egali-
tarian society. 
 Thus, like the ecology, peace, and feminist movements, precursors of the 
contemporary movement are to be found in the late nineteenth century. One 
of the first organizations to act for the respect of human rights and against 
racism mobilized in France over the “Dreyfus Affair” in 1898. In that year a 
young Jewish officer was excluded from the army, officially because he was 
a traitor, but in fact because he was Jewish. The Ligue des droits de l’Homme 
was created to support Dreyfus and still exists today. More or less at the same 
time, in England humanist clubs opposed British colonialism and slavery. In 
the 1920s, a league against colonial oppression, whose first president was 
Albert Einstein, was set up in several European countries to criticize colonial-
ism and bring to the fore its abuses. 
 The two world wars generated other types of human rights organizations. 
Several organizations were created with the mission of visiting war prisoners, 
giving them assistance and watching over prison conditions. Other organiza-
tions offered relief to war deportees, political refugees, immigrants, families 
in distress, and others. During that period, all these organizations which acted 
in favor of people whose human rights—broadly defined—were infringed, 
drew their resources from the three traditions discussed above and worked 
most of the time separately. They did not form a unified movement. They 
looked more like voluntary associations than social movement organizations. 
Their principal aim was to provide relief to the disadvantaged living in the 
colonies, to refugees, to immigrants, to war survivors and their families, to 
the victims of racist acts, as well as to others whose human rights were being 
violated. They offered relief to other people collectively, but not on the basis 
of a political conflict. They provided assistance, but in the absence of sus-
tained political claim-making addressed to power holders. At that time, soli-
darity organizations resembled today’s organizations of the third sector. 
 One had to wait until the late 1960s (in North America) and the 1970s (in 
Europe) for the emergence of a movement that articulated the human rights 
issue both politically and within a coherent framework. At that time, the 
organizations of the solidarity movement, like the early peace, ecology, and 
Florence Passy 10 
feminist groups, underwent a deep transformation, following a not less radi-
cal transformation of society. After World War II, Western society went 
through a long process of change that generated new cultural and social con-
flicts. The increasingly complex and highly differentiated post-industrial 
society (Bell 1973; Luhmann 1982) gave birth to new social strains upon 
which new collective actors based their political claims (Brand 1982; Meluc-
ci 1989, 1996; Raschke 1985; Touraine 1978, 1984). According to Kriesi 
(1989, 1993), contemporary society entails two contradictions which were 
politicized by the new social movements: control and risks. On the one hand, 
in contemporary society the public sphere increasingly penetrates the private 
sphere (Habermas 1984). For example, education and health care, which in 
previous centuries were left to individuals and families, are now managed 
and controlled by the state by means of welfare-state policies. Moreover, this 
highly technocratic society develops more and more sophisticated means of 
control, supported by the development of computer engineering. The control 
by the state, as well as by private companies, over the life of individuals has 
never been as strong as today. On the other hand, the contemporary society 
becomes a risk society (Beck 1986). New technological advances have pro-
duced new risks unknown before. We now have the capability to destroy the 
planet and humankind by means of nuclear technology (Melucci 1996). Re-
acting to the increasing control exerted by the state over individual autonomy 
and pushed by the new technological risks, the new social movements be-
came crucial collective actors on the Western political scene. 
 The solidarity movement participated fully in this renewal of the social 
movement sector. As a consequence, the organizations that have emerged 
since then are quite distinct from the old solidarity associations of the late 
nineteenth century. First of all, these organizations have a genuine political 
orientation. Behind their demands—for the respect of human rights, against 
racism, for helping the Third World, in defense of immigrant workers and 
political refugees—there is a quest for individual emancipation and a deep 
democratization both of Western and non-Western society. Second, as a con-
sequence of their mobilization around the new cleavage produced by the 
contradictions of the contemporary society—that is, as a result of the politici-
zation of their acts—the action repertoire of the solidarity movement has 
changed (Passy 1998). The old repertoire was dominated by acts of assistance 
and relief. The movement organizations gave the disadvantaged material and 
moral assistance, providing them with food, clothes, legal advice, and so 
forth. While most of the organizations of the new solidarity movement still 
provide this kind of assistance, now their actions also include political claim-
making addressed to power holders. In other words, their traditional assis-
tance-oriented praxis is now paralleled by a political praxis based on the 
same political cleavage in which the other new social movements are an-
chored. Third, the political potential of the solidarity movement has been 
transformed as well. While the old solidarity movement mobilized intellectu-
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al, libertarian, and humanist elites, Christians, and workers nourished in the 
socialist tradition, the new movement has its social roots in the new middle 
class—more specifically, in one particular segment of the new middle class: 
the social-cultural specialists (Kriesi 1989).6 Fourth, a decentralized and more 
democratic organizational structure has replaced a hierarchical and central-
ized structure. Finally, the various organizations of the solidarity movement 
are linked to each other independently of the issues they address. The new 
movement has a unity and a political coherence that it lacked before, as it 
mobilizes around the new lines of conflict in contemporary society and rides 
the political cleavage generated by post-industrial society. In this sense, it has 
become a genuine social movement. In addition, the solidarity movement has 
intensified its links to the other new social movements, which now become 
interconnected. They are all anchored in the same cleavage. This gives them 
unity and political coherence as a specific movement family. 
 To summarize, it is in the 1960s and 1970s (depending on the country) that 
the solidarity movement as we know it today emerged in the public sphere. 
While the sources of the struggle for human rights, like those pertaining to 
ecology, peace, and women’s movements, date back to the nineteenth centu-
ry, its anchoring in a political cleavage is more recent. The new lines of con-
flict, which stem from the transformation of contemporary society, have 
given birth to a new political actor. 
 
A Multi-Level Movement: 
Areas and Levels of Intervention 
 
In addition to drawing its resources from three distinct cultural cosmologies 
and mobilizing around a specific political cleavage, two other features of the 
solidarity movement must be stressed: it is active in different areas and on 
different levels. The old movement comprised only human rights organiza-
tions active on the various forefronts of human rights violations: slavery, 
colonial oppression, immigration, mass deportations, and so forth. The new 
movement, after its transformation in the 1960s and 1970s, underwent a pro-
cess of differentiation. Its organizations now specialize in specific domains 
and are spread over four branches, that is, four areas of intervention: human 
rights, development aid, immigration/asylum, and antiracism. 
 A first specialization occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when development 
aid organizations (for Third World countries) emerged. Within this branch, 
we find committees looking at particular countries (antiapartheid committees, 
Nicaragua committees, Eritrea committees, etc.) as well as organizations 
working more broadly on development aid issues (Terre des Hommes, Cari-
tas, etc.). While the former support specific political regimes and provide 
these populations with material help, the latter are involved in a more general 
fashion in the field of development aid. Approximately during the 1980s in 
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Europe, and earlier in North America, the increasing salience of immigration 
and political asylum issues brought to the fore a third branch of the solidarity 
movement, mobilizing massively on behalf of immigrants, asylum seekers, 
and political refugees. The whole twentieth century witnessed important 
waves of migrations, generally as a consequence of wars. Yet, for a long 
time, this issue was not framed politically. Human rights organizations inter-
vened to help migrants with material assistance, but did not politically articu-
late the issue—until the 1980s. Several human rights organizations remain 
active in this field (e.g., Amnesty International and the Ligue des droits de 
l’Homme), but they are not the leading actors. About the same time in certain 
countries and later in others, a further differentiation occurred within the 
movement with the emergence of a fourth branch: antiracism. This branch is 
intimately linked to the immigration/asylum area of intervention. It mobilizes 
to combat racist attacks against foreigners and the rise of the extreme right. 
The development of this branch of the solidarity movement is specific to 
Europe, with no counterpart in North America. 
 Beside its four branches, the contemporary solidarity movement also has 
different levels of intervention. Generally, social movement organizations are 
active at the local and/or national level. The prevailing level of intervention is 
to some extent determined by the structure of the state (Kriesi et al. 1995). 
For example, in France, a highly centralized state, social movements target 
mostly the national government. In contrast, in federal countries like Germa-
ny, Switzerland, and the United States, they often address local authorities. 
The solidarity movement is no exception to this rule, but here we can identify 
a fourth level: the international level. The solidarity movement is transna-
tional in scope. Many organizations in the movement are present in various 
countries, that is, they are transnational social movement organizations 
(Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997). Amnesty International, Terre des 
Hommes, the Ligue des droits de l’Homme, and the Ligue contre le racisme 
et l’antisémitisme are only some examples. The fact that the movement often 
mobilizes on behalf of populations in other countries has facilitated its ex-
pansion to the international arena. In addition, such expansion has been 
pushed further by the existence of supranational political structures, such as 
the United Nations, which provide the movement with opportunities for act-
ing at that level. 
 As Tilly (1986a) has shown convincingly, contentious politics parallels 
transformations in the sources and distribution of power. The modern social 
movement emerged in the nineteenth century following a long period of 
construction of the national state. Since World War II, new power centers 
have been created at the supranational level (e.g., the United Nations and the 
European Community) although they have not replaced the national ones.7 In 
other words, we are not witnessing a shift from the national to transnational 
level comparable to that which brought the main focus of contentious politics 
from the local to the national level. Nevertheless, supranational structures 
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offer social movements new political opportunities to address their claims 
(Passy 1999). In spite of its weakness, the United Nations is a particularly 
relevant political power center. With the creation of the Human Rights 
Commission and the possibility for social movement organizations to be 
granted consultative status—formal acceptance within this supranational 
political structure—the United Nations offers the solidarity movement real 
opportunities to address its claims, especially for its human rights and devel-
opment aid branches, less for its immigration/asylum and antiracism branch-
es. Because immigration policy is still a prerogative of national states and 
most racist attacks target immigrants in given countries, the two latter 
branches of the movement continue to focus on the national level. However, 
it is likely that, if the development of the European Community continues 
and this power center will be able to frame a coherent and effective immigra-
tion policy for its member states (as recent developments would suggest), 
protests regarding these issues could also shift to the transnational level 
(Soysal 1994), leading, at least in part, to a Europeanization of social move-
ments (Imig and Tarrow 1999). 
 Thus, the contemporary solidarity movement is involved in a multi-level 
game (Marks and McAdam 1996). It mostly targets national authorities, as 
well as local authorities (particularly in decentralized countries), but it also 
seizes the political opportunities provided by the United Nations. In doing so, 
it is comparable to the ecology movement, whose claim-making is also em-
bedded in a multi-level game which comprises the local, national, and—in 
particular since the 1992 Rio environmental summit—transnational levels. 
 
Patterns of Mobilization: A Brief Overview 
 
Western society values individual freedom, personal success, and self-interest 
so highly that political altruism should be a marginal form of collective ac-
tion. Yet, the mobilization by the solidarity movement attests to the opposite. 
To give a brief overview its mobilization, I draw from the comparative study 
by Kriesi and others (1995) on new social movements in four European coun-
tries: France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.8 But, as we turn to 
the patterns of mobilization of the solidarity movement, we must raise two 
theoretical points that have been raised by the political process approach to 
the study of social movements. Contentious collective action varies in its 
extent and forms according to the political context and to the salience of 
political cleavages. More specifically, Kriesi and his colleagues stress the 
formal structure of the state (i.e., the degree of functional separation of pow-
ers, the degree of territorial centralization of the state, the coherence of the 
public administration, and the presence of direct democratic procedures) and 
the informal strategies of the authorities towards social movements (i.e., 
inclusive and facilitating strategies or exclusive and repressive strategies). 
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The latter display more or less disruptive forms of action. For example, there 
is a striking difference between France and Switzerland as to the movements’ 
action repertoires: in highly centralized France they tend to be more disrup-
tive than in extremely fragmented Switzerland (Giugni and Passy 1993). 
 In addition to this combination of formal and informal political opportuni-
ties, Kriesi and colleagues stress the impact of the configuration of power and 
the structure of alliances to explain the development of protest over time. In 
this respect, they argue that the presence of a socialist party—the main ally of 
the new social movements—in the government lead to the demobilization of 
these movements. In contrast, when the socialists are in opposition they are 
facilitated by a powerful ally, particularly so if the socialists are engaged in a 
struggle for the hegemony within the Left against an important Communist 
party and use the movements in this struggle. 
 Finally, Kriesi and his co-authors point to the salience of political cleavag-
es to account for the relative strength of new social movements. They main-
tain that the new social movements—which mobilized on a new cleavage, as 
we have seen—are stronger where the traditional cleavages (the class, reli-
gious, center/periphery, and urban/rural cleavages) have been pacified. In 
contrast, in countries where these cleavages still mobilize important social 
and political forces, the opportunities available for the mobilization of new 
collective actors are limited. Of the four countries included in the study, only 
France still has largely salient traditional cleavages, in particular the class and 
center/periphery cleavages. This, to a large extent, explains the weakness of 
new social movements in that country. 
 The emergence and development of the solidarity movement in Europe is 
much influenced by all these aspects of the political opportunity structure. To 
begin with, as table 1.1 shows, not only is the whole new social movement 
family the main force of contention (at least during the 1975-89 period exam-
ined by Kriesi et al.), except in France, where traditional cleavages are still 
dominant. Furthermore, the solidarity movement displays high levels of mo-
bilization in Germany and Switzerland, and the highest overall in the Nether-
lands. Confirming the cleavages salience hypothesis, France is once again an 
exception, for the solidarity movement has only weakly mobilized during the 
period under study. Thus, contrary to expectations that may be drawn from 
the individualistic orientation of contemporary society, political altruism is 
far from being a marginal form of contentious collective action. But how did 
the solidarity movement develop over time in these four European countries? 
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TABLE 1.1 
Distribution of Unconventional Protest Events by Movement 
in Four Countries, 1975-1989 
 
 France Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Solidarity movement   9.2 15.0 17.7 16.0 
Antinuclear movement 
(both energy and weapons) 
13.2 24.4 16.9   7.9 
Ecology movement   4.4 11.3   8.0 10.6 
Peace movement   4.0   7.1   5.1   5.3 
Squatters’ and other 
countercultural movements 
  3.0 13.4 14.1 18.4 
Women’s movement   1.5   1.7   1.6   2.1 
Gay rights movement   0.8   0.3   2.0   0.7 
Total new social movements 36.1 73.2 65.4 61.0 
Total other movements 63.9 26.8 34.6 39.0 
Total       100%       100%       100%       100% 
N     2132     2343     1319     1215 
Source: Kriesi et al. (1995, 20) 
 
 
While the pacification of traditional cleavages is a key factor in understand-
ing its relative strength, the configuration of power allows us to account for 
fluctuations in the level of mobilization. Figure 1.1 shows the number of 
protest events produced yearly by the solidarity movement between 1975 and 
1989. Two findings are worth mentioning. First, perhaps with the exception 
of France, the general trend shows a growth in the four countries, for the 
number of events has increased during the period under study. Second, the 
movement displays important ebbs and flows which differ from one country 
to the other. The contrasting development of mobilization is particularly 
striking if we compare the German and French movements; while the former 
displays an upsurge of activity after 1980, the latter has experienced a sharp 
decline that lasted until 1984. 
 The fluctuations in the level of mobilization of the solidarity movement can 
be explained by the fortunes of the socialist parties. In Germany, we observe 
an abrupt increase in mobilization starting in 1980, leading to a peak in 1983. 
Here the movement became part of a larger cycle of protest that involved 
other movements as well, above all the peace movement. The nuclear weap-
ons issue was at the heart of this protest cycle. At the same time, this strong 
mobilization was facilitated by the exit of the social-democratic party from 
the government in 1982. Being in the opposition, the latter could serve as a 
powerful ally for all new social movements. Previously, it was very difficult 
for the social-democrats to support the movements, which therefore were 
lacking a crucial political ally. Thus, the presence of the social-democrats in 
the opposition facilitated the German solidarity movement in the 1980s. A 
FIGURE 1.1 
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Source: Calculations based on data by Kriesi et al. (1995) 
 
 
similar trajectory was followed by its Dutch counterpart. As in Germany, in 
the Netherlands the solidarity movement was caught in the protest wave 
against application of the “double-track” decision by NATO to deploy nucle-
ar missiles in Europe while continuing negotiations for a scaling down of the 
atomic arsenal. The peak of the movement’s mobilization was reached in 
1982. At the same time, the center-left coalition stepped down from govern-
mental power, and this bolstered the actions of the whole new social move-
ment family. In contrast, the French solidarity movement declined precisely 
when in the other countries mobilization reached its peak. When President 
Mitterrand seized power in 1981, the movement lost its principal ally, the 
Socialist party. Moreover, like the other new social movements, the actors 
participating in the solidarity movement hoped that the socialists would pro-
mote important reforms that would take into account their claims. This dis-
couraged them from mobilizing. However, the movement was revived in 
1985, even though the socialists were still in power. In fact, for reasons to 
which we shall return below, the French Left largely facilitated the move-
ment’s antiracist branch. In Switzerland, the development of the solidarity 
movement cannot be explained by a change in the composition of the nation-
al government, as it has remained unchanged since 1959. In a highly decen-
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tralized political system such as Switzerland’s, the local or regional configu-
ration of power may be more important to fluctuations in the mobilization by 
social movement than the national one. Much of the fluctuation in the devel-
opment of the Swiss solidarity movement is due to the issue of political asy-
lum. As in Switzerland asylum policy is implemented by the local powers, 
the ebbs and flows we observe in Switzerland might largely be explained by 
changes at the local level. 
 To summarize, the solidarity movement is an important extra-
parliamentary political actor in several European countries. However, as table 
1.2 illustrates, the activity of the movements’ four areas of intervention is 
unequal. Generally speaking, antiracism and development aid are the most 
active branches. Antiracism is particularly strong in France and Germany. 
More than half of the mobilization of the whole movement in these two coun-
tries occurs in this area, whereas in the Netherlands and Switzerland devel-
opment aid is the most frequently raised issue. How can we explain these 
differences, which seem to separate the two large countries from the two 
smaller ones? Since the beginning of the 1980s, France and Germany have 
witnessed a revival of extreme-right activism which has fostered politiciza-
tion of the immigration issue. In France, the Front National has framed its 
discourse around this issue. The German extreme right, mostly organized as 
an extra-parliamentary actor, did the same. In these two countries, immigra-
tion politics was marked by worrisome waves of racist attacks against asylum 
seekers and immigrant workers. This offered the solidarity movement an 
opportunity to mobilize, and hence provoked strong countermobilization 
organized mainly by leftist parties and by the movement. In addition, in 
France the Socialist party continued to support the antiracism branch of the 
movement even while in government. The socialists used antiracist groups—
particularly, SOS-Racisme—to destabilize the right-wing parties and coun-
teract the spectacular rise of the Front National (Duyvendak 1995). While 
their support was guided by strategic reasons, it provided these organizations 
useful political opportunities. 
 The extreme right was also active in the Netherlands and Switzerland, but 
to a lesser extent, which might explain the weaker antiracist mobilization. In 
these two countries, the solidarity movement mobilized mainly on develop-
ment aid issues. Why is it so? A possible explanation lies in the impact of 
institutional facilitation. In the Netherlands and Switzerland the prevailing 
strategies of the authorities towards social movements are inclusive, hence 
facilitating their mobilization. However, even states that follow inclusive 
prevailing strategies do so only—or at least mostly—toward the movements’ 
moderate sectors. In the case of the solidarity movement, the development aid 
branch and the human rights branch comprise the most moderate sector. In 
Switzerland, its moderation has even contributed to the elaboration of strate-
gies of cooperation between the movement and the state (Giugni and Passy 
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TABLE 1.2 
Distribution of Unconventional Protest Events of the Four Branches 
of the Solidarity Movement in Four Countries, 1975-1989 
 
 France Germany Netherlands Switzerland 
Human rights   9.1 10.1 15.3 17.0 
Development aid 13.7 28.7 47.0 50.0 
Immigration/asylum 16.4 11.9 13.7 29.7 
Antiracism 60.7 49.2 24.0   3.4 
Total       100%       100%       100%       100% 
N       219       494       313       296 
Source: Calculations based on data by Kriesi et al. (1995) 
 
 
1998). Thus, the facilitating strategies of the authorities in the Netherlands 
and Switzerland towards the moderate development aid organizations led this 
branch of the movement to a high level of mobilization. 
 Finally, we observe the relatively weak mobilization of the human rights 
branch, the movement’s oldest area of intervention. This is partly due to the 
fact that its claims are spread over the other branches. But, above all, human 
rights organizations, as mentioned above, find important political opportuni-
ties at the international level. While, overall, this is certainly the less active 
branch of the movement, it is also probably less active at the national level 
than at the international one. 
 
Political Altruism: 
Paradoxes and Theoretical Challenges 
 
As we have seen, the solidarity movement displays certain features: it is 
(apparently) altruistic-oriented; it mobilizes based upon a specific political 
cleavage; it is embedded in a specific social environment that gives it cultural 
and symbolic resources; it operates in different areas of intervention; and acts 
at different levels of intervention (especially at the international level). 
Among all these characteristics, the altruistic orientation is, at least at first 
glance, the one that sets it decidedly apart from other movements. But this 
feature raises two paradoxes: the first could be defined as a cultural paradox, 
while the second is of a theoretical nature. These paradoxes are worth briefly 
discussing here. 
 The first paradox was hinted at in the discussion above. The solidarity 
movement has emerged in Western society, which puts individualism, indi-
vidual freedom, self-interest, and personal success high in the hierarchy of 
social values. In this society, however, thousands of people join the solidarity 
movement with the aim of providing other persons with material and moral 
support. How can we make sense of such altruistic political behavior in a 
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society that is mainly concerned with enhancing the value of the self? This 
paradox has been framed by Wuthnow (1991) in his study of the voluntary 
sector in the United States. He faces exactly the same dilemma raised by the 
solidarity movement: while the dominant myths of the American society 
value individualism, more than half of the adult population volunteers on a 
regular basis, that is, they act on behalf of other people. Wuthnow shows that, 
in the end, this paradox does not exist, for “acts of compassion” are in fact a 
channel of self-expression. They help people to “feel better” and are a way to 
convey caring feelings. Volunteering is, according to Wuthnow, a way to 
express one’s own individuality. If this conclusion proves correct, it should 
have two main implications. First, “acts of compassion” are not inconsistent 
with Western society’s dominant value of individualism. Second, we can 
wonder about the altruistic bases of the kind of behavior studied by Wuth-
now. According to Bar-Tal’s (1985-86) definition, one of the four character-
istics of altruism is to perform a deed without expecting any reward. “Feeling 
better” would be one such reward. Therefore, those who perform “acts of 
compassion” do get rewards. Here we could start a broader discussion about 
internal and external rewards, but this would take us too far from the present 
purpose. Suffice it to say that Bar-Tal speaks of external rewards, while those 
received by the people interviewed by Wuthnow are internal ones. Their 
rewards do not come from the individuals’ external environment, but rather 
from within the individuals themselves. Thus, following Bar-Tal’s definition, 
the “acts of compassion” investigated by Wuthnow are altruistic. But if we 
adopt a more restrictive definition of altruism and exclude any rewards, be 
they external or internal, then these acts are not altruistic. 
 Concerning the solidarity movement, the question is whether involvement 
in this form of political altruism is also a way to express one’s own individu-
ality. Is helping populations in Third World countries, giving immigrants 
support, mobilizing on behalf of other people whose fundamental rights are 
being violated a way to “feel better,” to find personal fulfillment? Is partici-
pation in the solidarity movement consistent with the Western society’s dom-
inant cultural values of individual freedom, personal success, and self-
interest? Or, on the contrary, does this type of political engagement raise a 
cultural paradox? A related set of questions, furthermore, asks whether par-
ticipation in the solidarity movement is a genuine expression of political 
altruism. Do activists involved in this movement receive any rewards at all? 
Which motivations push people like Eva, our activist in favor of asylum-
seeker rights, to invest time and effort on behalf of other people? Do they 
“feel better” after such “acts of compassion”? 
 The second paradox raised by the solidarity movement relates to the theory 
of collective action, and brings us to Olson’s well-known Logic of Collective 
Action (1965). Olson maintains that it is irrational for individuals to do some-
thing for the production of collective goods. The peculiarity of such goods is 
that they are to be shared by all individuals in a community, that is, all indi-
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viduals in that community will benefit from them, regardless of their partici-
pation in its production. Therefore, individuals would have no reason to pay 
the costs of obtaining goods from which they would benefit anyway. Moreo-
ver, the action of a single individual is so marginal that it would not affect the 
likelihood that the public goods be produced. This paradox, also emphasized 
by Downs (1957) in relation to voting behavior, is all the more relevant and 
problematic in the case of altruism: people will get the fruits of mobilization 
whether or not they participate in the movement, for the outcome of mobili-
zation is addressed to others. 
 Thus, the question is: How can we make sense of political altruism with the 
theoretical tools offered by Olson’s analysis of collective action and, more 
generally, following a rational choice model? In his groundbreaking book, 
Olson has little to say about this type of contentious collective action, arguing 
that individuals who work on behalf of other people are irrational. He sug-
gests, therefore, that we use other heuristic tools to explain this kind of be-
havior, namely those developed by psychology. In other words, he suggests 
that we go back to psychological models put forward in the early twentieth 
century and later elaborated by collective behavior theorists. Yet, in the light 
of fundamental criticisms addressed by resource mobilization and political 
process approaches to collective behavior models (e.g., McAdam 1982; 
McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Tilly et al. 1975), this does not seem to 
be a promising path. According to resource mobilization and political process 
theorists, collective action is a rational effort to obtain certain goals rather 
than, as proponents of the collective behavior perspective maintain, the prod-
uct of psychological reactions to the social stress stemming from macro-
structural changes in society. 
 As Olson’s suggestion to refer to psychological models in order to explain 
political altruism cannot reasonably be taken into account without denying 
the intention-oriented nature of this type of political behavior, how can we 
then grasp the logic of political altruism? Does it follow a logic of mobiliza-
tion different from that of self-oriented actions? Do the patterns of individual 
participation in the solidarity movement differ substantially from those in 
other movements? Is the process of mobilization influenced by the move-
ment’s orientation? In brief, is political altruism governed by a distinct logic 
of mobilization? Furthermore, we can wonder whether the two paradoxes 
mentioned above, which refer to the micro level of analysis, have some re-
percussions on the macro level as well. Do the organizations of the solidarity 
movement use different forms of actions in order to mobilize people on be-
half of others? Does political altruism have its own action repertoire? By the 
same token, do actors involved in the solidarity movement use distinct dis-
cursive strategies? Specifically, do they need to link altruistic claims to par-
ticularistic interests in order to facilitate individual participation in the 
movement? It is in these and related questions that lies the theoretical chal-
lenge posed by the solidarity movement and political altruism. 
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 The paradox raised by Olson in the 1960s leads us to a broad reflection on 
the heuristic tools that social scientists can use to study political altruism. In 
order to examine this matter in a more systematic fashion, we propose to 
discuss three dominant paradigms in social science and see what they can 
bring to the study of political altruism. Table 1.3, which is largely inspired by 
a recent assessment of the study of comparative politics by Lichbach (1997), 
tries to sort out the respective features of these paradigms and to assess their 
major strengths and weaknesses for the study of political altruism. The three 
major research schools in social science—rationalist, culturalist, and structur-
alist (e.g., Lichbach 1997)—rely on different ontological perspectives based 
on their different perceptions of the social world. We shall review the onto-
logical basis of each of these research traditions, then study the specific focus 
of their analyses by putting them in the context of the study of political altru-
ism, and, finally assess their strengths and weaknesses in relation to an un-
derstanding of political altruism. 
 The rationalist paradigm sees the world from an individual angle. Collec-
tivities have no specific status; they are understood by means of individuals’ 
behaviors. Rationalists interpret individual action from its motivation. In 
other words, they put individual intentions at the center of their theories. 
Individual desires and beliefs motivate action. On the micro level, rationalists 
focus on the actors’ decision; on the macro level, on collective choices and 
strategies. Thus, rationalist theorists stress individual motivations, desires, 
beliefs, and rewards to understand participation in altruistic collective action. 
In addition, they emphasize the collective choices of forms of action as well 
as discursive strategies that lead individuals to join altruistic collective ac-
tion. The major strength of the rationalist paradigm lies in the view of politi-
cal altruism as motivated human behavior. In fact, rationalists have two ways 
to examine political altruism: either they judge, as Olson did, a priori that 
altruistic actions are not rational, and then they must study them with other 
heuristic tools; or they look at intentions that bring individuals to commit 
themselves to political altruism. In the latter option, the rationalist paradigm 
can offer social scientists an important avenue of research into individual 
motivations, political goals, group strategies, and the like. This perspective 
lends itself to the study of people who engage in altruistic collective action 
and of strategies by political groups that benefit directly from their actions, as 
in the case of the solidarity movement. While individual motivations are 
crucial to a better understanding of political altruism, this approach has its 
weaknesses. Rationalists’ studies have often been criticized on various 
grounds (e.g., Green and Shapiro 1994). Without getting into the details of 
these criticisms, we can say that one of the major difficulties in this approach 
stems from its 
  
TABLE 1.3 
Three Paradigms for the Study of Political Altruism 
 
 Rationalist 
 
Culturalist Structuralist 
Onthology • Rational actors 
• Intentional expla-
nation 
• Methodological 
individualism 
• Rules among 
actors 
• Intersubjectivity 
• Common 
knowledge and 
values 
• Social constructiv-
ism 
• Relations among 
actors 
• Institutional frame 
• Structural realism 
Focus of the 
analysis 
 
   
Micro level • Actors’ decision 
to participate 
• Individual values 
and beliefs 
• Identity formation 
• Identification pro-
cesses 
• Social constraints 
• Location of actors 
in the social sys-
tem and social 
networks 
 
Macro level 
 
• Collective choice 
of forms of ac-
tions and discur-
sive strategies 
 
• Value system 
• Cultural framings 
 
• Mobilizing struc-
tures 
• Political oppor-
tunity structures 
Explanatory 
power 
 
   
Strengths • Political altruism 
as rational, inten-
tional, and goal-
oriented behavior 
• Political altru-
ism as meaningful 
action 
• Social construc-
tion embedded in 
a cultural context 
• Space/time varia-
tions 
• Political altruism 
as not merely vol-
untaristic behavior 
or the product of 
cultural condition-
ing 
• Impact of institu-
tional context 
• Space/time-
varying process 
 
Weaknesses • Instrumental 
rationality 
• Mechanical view 
of social action 
• Tautology 
• Voluntarism 
absent 
 
• Deterministic 
view 
• Voluntarism 
absent 
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narrow view of the human being. Rationalists perceive individuals as being 
interest-oriented and hence behaving to meet or maximize their private inter-
ests. The role of the larger social environment, which impinges upon individ-
ual interests, is neglected. This leads rationalist theorists to have a “mechani-
cal-behavioral view of subjectivity and adopt a particularly anemic or thin 
version of intentionality, rationality, and interests” (256). In this perspective, 
the study of political altruism is reduced to an analysis of rewards. Yet, in the 
study of collective action, rationalists have tended to go beyond such a thin 
version of intentionality by taking into account the role of the social envi-
ronment and the social construction of subjectivity (e.g., Gould 1993; Mar-
well and Oliver 1993). The study of political altruism should learn from this 
lesson. 
 The culturalist paradigm looks at society through the lens of norms and 
intersubjectivity. In contrast to the rationalist approach, individuals have no 
existence outside their communities, which are at the center of their analyses. 
Culture forms the intersubjective link between individuals. Individuals be-
longing to the same community share common knowledge, understandings, 
beliefs, values, cognitions, and identities. Thus culture is seen as a social 
construction. Culturalist theorists focus basically on the construction of val-
ues and beliefs, the formation of individual and collective identities, and the 
identification of value systems and collective frames. Due to their different 
view of social reality, culturalists highlight other sides of political altruism. 
They define the role of cultural factors leading to political altruism—either at 
the micro level, by stressing the specific values, beliefs, and identities that 
facilitate participation in this type of collective action and by stressing the 
processes of socialization and identity formation that allow one to participate; 
or at the macro level, by understanding the cultural frames and narratives that 
give shape to altruistic behaviors. One of the strengths of the culturalist ap-
proach lies in its view of political altruism as a meaningful action and as a 
construction, in contrast to rationalists, who do not study where interests 
come from and how they emerge. The process of formation of individual 
interests are at the core of culturalists’ analyses. A further strength of this 
paradigm is that it allows explanation of variations in the forms of political 
altruism from one society to the other, from one country to the other. Ration-
ality varies among cultures. It is likely that certain cultural settings or reper-
toires facilitate political altruism by offering a language for its emergence. As 
Wolfe (1998) has put it: “Because [altruism] is not latent in human genes, it 
has to be activated, and the degree of activation varies across time and space. 
Some historical periods manifest more altruistic behavior than others, and 
some countries tend to be more altruistic than others” (41).9 Indeed, in our 
brief overview of patterns of mobilization of the solidarity movement, we 
have seen that, depending on the salience of cultural cleavages, it is stronger 
in certain countries and weaker in others. On the other hand, the tendency of 
culturalist theorists to neglect the role of individuals is a major weakness of 
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this approach. While, as Lichbach (1997) has put it, “rationalists sacrifice the 
subject and surrender the self, undoing the community and unmaking the 
collectivity” (257), the culturalists do exactly the opposite and tend to deny 
all forms of individual voluntarism. A further weakness of this paradigm lies 
in its problematic capacity of hypothesis falsification (Lichbach 1997). Cul-
turalists are put in an uncomfortable position to explain the link between 
norms, or cultural standards, and action, thus running the risk of tautology. 
 The ontological basis of the structuralist paradigm lies chiefly in the insti-
tutional frames and the interactions among the various parts of a system. At 
the micro level, the main focus of the analysis is on social interactions and on 
the location of actors in the social system and in social networks. At the mac-
ro level, structuralists stress mobilizing structures and political institutions, 
which provide both constraints and opportunities for the emergence of politi-
cal altruism. The major strength of the structuralist approach is its attention to 
the institutional and relational contexts as structural conditions for the emer-
gence of political altruism. At the same time, it allows for comparisons across 
time and sector for this type of collective action. Once again, our discussion 
of the patterns of mobilization of the solidarity movement has highlighted the 
role played by institutional factors. As in the case of the other two paradigms, 
the structuralist approach has a number of weaknesses, particularly in the 
study of political altruism. Structuralists and culturalists share the same 
weakness with regard to their conception of the human being. Actors are 
absent from their view of the social world. To use Lichbach’s (1997) apt 
phrase, “[s]tructuralists thus produce a bloodless social science: People are 
the victims of and silent witnesses to history” (258). In other words, individ-
uals belonging to the same system, to the same category or to the same net-
work play the same game; their intentions are missed in structural explana-
tions. Similarly, structuralists are prisoners of a deterministic view of society, 
in the sense that specific structural or relational settings are bound to provoke 
a specific type of outcomes.  
 To summarize, in spite of inevitable problems and weaknesses, each of the 
three paradigms for the study of political altruism reveals specific aspects of 
the social phenomenon at hand. The rationalist paradigm emphasizes the 
motivations that lead to political altruism. This perspective allows us to ascer-
tain whether actions defined a priori as political altruism, such as those of the 
solidarity movement, are genuine “acts of compassion.” Moreover, the ra-
tionalist paradigm reveals the collective strategies of groups acting on behalf 
of others. The culturalist paradigm stresses the cultural repertoires that make 
the activation of political altruism possible. This can be done at the individual 
level, by examining their role in the formation of individuals beliefs and 
cognitions, and at the collective level, by looking at discursive repertoires, 
narratives, and cultural frames of political altruism. The structuralist para-
digm focuses on structural constraints and opportunities which yield indi-
vidual or collective conditions that facilitate political altruism.  
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 As we have noted, each tradition has substantial limitation in explaining 
political altruism in its complexity and multifaced aspects. While in the past, 
social scientists have tended to lock themselves in one theoretical tradition, 
today many authors turn to more eclectic explanations of social and political 
phenomena (e.g., Alexander and Giesen 1987; Archer 1995; Berger and 
Luckmann 1989; Bourdieu 1977; Coleman 1990; Giddens 1984; Habermas 
1984; Lichbach 1997). As Wolfe (1998) has emphasized in his discussion of 
the various theories that have contributed to the study of altruism, we need to 
grasp the complexity and multiplicity of human behaviors, and go beyond 
monocausal explanations. We still have too little systematic research on po-
litical altruism for excluding one of those traditions in favor of the other two. 
At this stage of our knowledge of this subject matter, we will be better off if 
we take into accounts the strengths and promises of all three perspectives. We 
will surely benefit from their different approaches to gain a better understand-
ing of political altruism. 
 
Notes 
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 1. For a cross-national comparison of voluntary associations, see Salamon and 
Anheier (1998). 
 2. See also Barber (1984), Putnam (1993), and Wuthnow (1991, 1995). 
 3. For definitions of claim-making and social movements, see Tilly (1978, 1995a) 
and Tarrow (1998). 
 4. See also Lipset and Rokkan (1967). 
 5. This is one of the main contributions of resource mobilization theory (e.g., 
Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977). This approach stresses the role of resources 
for the emergence of social movements, thus criticizing “breakdown theories” (Tilly 
et al. 1975) such as the theory of collective behavior (e.g., Smelser 1962; Turner and 
Killian 1957). 
 6. This argument has received strong empirical support (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; 
Inglehart 1990; Kriesi 1989, 1993; Passy 1998). 
 7. This is particularly true for the United Nations, which remains a weak aggre-
gate of states rather than a genuine and powerful supranational political entity. 
 8. The method they used is protest event analysis. For details on this method, see 
the appendix in Kriesi et al. (1995) as well as Rucht, Koopmans, and Neidhardt 
(1998). 
 9. For instance, Jegstrup (1985-86) has shown that the rescue of Jews during 
World War II in Denmark was inspired by cultural reasons. 
